SCOTUS overturns CA9 on Warrantless CPS interrogations

The U. S. Supreme Court issued its decision today in Camreta v. Greene. Read the full decision here:
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1454.pdf

This is the 9th circuit case in which the circuit court found a Fourth Amendment violation based on a CPS worker and Sheriff's deputy's warrantless interrogation of a then 9-year-old at school. The 9th Circuit, though finding the violation, found that the official had qualified immunity since the law was unclear before. The deputy was granted cert in the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled it could review the appellate court's constitutional decision, even though Camreta was the prevailing party below, based on qualified immunity. Nevertheless, the Court held the case is moot, because Greene has no continuing stake in the controversy. Consequently, it vacated the portion of the 9th Circuit opinion that imposed the warrant requirement.

Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion in which Roberts, Scalia, Ginsberg and Alito joined. Scalia wrote a concurring opinion. Sotomayor, joined by Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in the result, but opining that the court should have decided only that the case was moot and vacated the judgment below. Kennedy, joined by Thomas, wrote a dissent concluding that Camreta as a "prevailing party" should not have been permitted to appeal the constitutional decision below, which he describes as "obiter dictum".

Thanks to the NACC yahoo group for notice of and the link to the decision and to members of the group for the concise summary quoted above.

Prof. Gates' Unconstitutional Arrest - Forbes.com

It may have been a Town v. Gown controversy rather than a racial incident. Or even, as Steven Colbert proposed on Comedy Central's "The Colbert Report," a jock v. nerd matter with Sgt. Crowley as the jock and Prof. Gates, pictured riding his tricycle on Martha's Vineyard, as the nerd. But I prefer to agree with Massachusetts criminal defense and civil rights attorney Harvey Silverglate, who, in this Forbes commentary, "Prof. Gate's Unconstitutional Arrest: There's a First Amendment right to be rude to a cop," argued persuasively that "fundamentally the situation can, and should, be analyzed as a free speech case."


In my two plus decade criminal defense career, I too saw many police reports that parroted the words "loud and tumultuous behavior which caused a crowd to gather and created public inconvenience, annoyance and alarm." Disorderly conduct is what the Boston police used when the City's equally unconstitutional "Sauntering and Loitering" Ordinance somehow didn't fit or wasn't enough. As a new, young, white law student in 1976, I was threatened with arrest by a Cambridge police officer for insisting that he shouldn't be smoking inside the front of the Porter Square Star Market right under the "No Smoking" sign. Unlike Prof. Gates, I swallowed my First Amendment rights and stopped my confrontation upon the police officer's threat even though I knew it would have been an unconstitutional arrest.


As Atty. Silverglate points out:

There is a serious problem in this country: Police are overly sensitive to insults from those they confront. And one can hardly blame the confronted citizen, especially if the citizen is doing nothing wrong when confronted by official power. This is, after all, a free country, and if "free" means anything meaningful, it means being left alone--especially in one's own home--when one is not breaking the law.

See the article also for Atty. Silverglate's brief but thorough history of First Amendment jurisprudence and the evolution of the "four exceptions to the First Amendment's protection for free speech."

Students' First Amendment rights take a hit at Supreme Court

While quoting past cases such as Tinker v. DesMoines Independent School District (school could not ban anti-war armbands) and Veronia School District v. Acton (a Fourth Amendment case that went against the student but contains the language that "children assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate,'") the U.S. Supreme Court ruled today that a Juneau, Alaska, high school could punish a student for unfurling and refusing to put away a banner that said, "BONG HITS 4 JESUS" at the Olympic torch parade on the public street outside the school.

In Morse v. Frederick Justice Roberts wrote the court's decision (5 1/2 to 3 1/2) noting that it was not unreasonable for the principal to conclude that "BONG HITS 4 JESUS" could "materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school" in the same way that sexual metaphors in a graduation speech did in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser.

Roberts wrote that Tinker allows for students' rights to not be absolute and this case is distinguishable because the Tinker court did not go through the "material and substantial disruption analysis" that was articulated in Bethel.

Presumably the answer to the question "Do high school students in public schools have the freedom under G. L. c. 71, § 82 to engage in non-school-sponsored expression that may reasonably be considered vulgar, but causes no disruption or disorder?" is still "affirmative" in Massachusetts and that a student in a similar situation would not be able to be punished without having caused an actual disruption in a Massachusetts high school. See the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling in Jeffrey J. Pyle v. School Committee of South Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 667 N.E.2d 869 (1996).

It's not KidLaw but I couldn't resist

After seeing this post from my friend and colleague Atty. Marie Saccoccio on the MassPrivateCounsel yahoogroup (for criminal and other defenders), I couldn't resist posting it here. (Sorry I don't know Marie's original source, so I can't cite it right now.)

Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. ___ (#06-605 , decided May 21, 2007)

"When the Court gets jittery, it reaches for its equivalent of a nicotine patch to calm its nerves: a good old per curiam summary reversal of the Ninth Circuit. Everyone on First Street is a little calmer after Monday.

"The plaintiffs in this case, who are white, sued under § 1983 after officers mistakenly searched their home looking for 4 black suspects. Turns out the plaintiffs had bought the home from the suspects shortly before the police got their search warrant.

"Just as it only rains when you forget your umbrella, going to sleep naked more or less guarantees that the cops will arrive that night. And so it was here. The officers rousted the plaintiffs out of the bed and forced them to make like Greek statues for 3 minutes (but probably minus the placid expressions on their faces), while police searched the rest of the house.

"The CA9 found that this treatment unnecessarily denuded the plaintiffs of their dignity and therefore their Fourth Amendment rights. Proving that turnabout is fair play, the CA9 stripped the officers of their qualified immunity. The court of appeals reasoned that once the officers saw the white occupants of the house, they should have known they had the wrong house and stopped the search.

"It took the Court 7 pages to set the law aright. Police may reasonably detain a house’s occupants during a search, to protect officer safety and the integrity of the search. Here, they did not have to abandon their search simply because they encountered persons of a different race than the suspects—“the presence of some Caucasians in the residence did not eliminate the possibility that the suspects lived there as well.”

"This was the rare case in which the CA9 was not politically correct enough, for the Court had to instruct that “it is not uncommon in our society for people of different races to live and work together”, or for that matter, to commit crimes together.

"Finally, the plaintiffs’ brief au naturel detention was reasonable because the suspects were believed to be armed and could have been hiding a gun under the bed covers. There was no allegation that the police left plaintiffs unclothed any longer than necessary to secure the room.

"JPS (+RBG) penned a two-page concurrence in the judgment, blasting the CA9 for issuing a hotly contested 2-1 decision as an unpublished opinion (a well-known CA9 tactic for hiding summary reversal candidates). He also restated his long-held view that the Court should not decide the constitutional merits of a case when it can more easily be resolved on qualified immunity grounds, as this one could. "