WHAT?@@!??

A young mother's apparently disturbed young friend steals her baby Thursday night so on Friday

the Department of Social Services took custody of the baby and his 16-month-old sister, and Sterrett's third child, a 2-year-old boy, was placed with relatives, according to a spokeswoman for the agency.

DSS previously investigated Sterrett for alleged neglect involving one of her other children. That case was closed last year, according to Alison Goodwin, a spokeswoman for DSS, who gave no details.

Does DSS not realize, like the Texas authorities in the FLDS case didn't realize, that they need specific, articulable "reasonable cause to believe that the removal of the child is necessary to protect him from further abuse or neglect"? See Mass. General Laws chapter 119, section 51B (emphasis added). Doesn't "further" imply that there had to have been some abuse or neglect in the first place?

Nothing in the Globe article about poor Ms. Sterrett's troubles indicates that there was any evidence of

reasonable cause to believe that a child under the age of eighteen years is suffering physical or emotional injury resulting from abuse inflicted upon him which causes harm or substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare including sexual abuse, or from neglect, including malnutrition, or who is determined to be physically dependent upon an addictive drug at birth

which is the applicable statutory definition from the infamous section 51A.

It's hard to tell for sure from the Globe article, but it seems as if this is another case of DSS breaking up a family in the name of protecting children from a parent they don't need protection from. Will the Globe report on Tuesday, after Ms. Sterrett's 72-hour hearing , if she gets her children back from the juvenile court judge? Will DSS apologize or even have its spokesperson report that they were wrong if Ms. Sterrett does get her children back?

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives even young mothers the right not to have their children seized by the state without probable cause.

Now they're suspending students for writing a list of names!

According to the Boston Globe:

High schoolers investigated
By Martin Finucane
Globe Staff / May 23, 2008

Two students at Silver Lake Regional High School are being kept out of school while police investigate whether lists the two students made of fellow students constitute a threat to the school community, the school district's superintendent said yesterday.

A teacher became concerned when she saw a male student throw away a piece of paper last Friday. She retrieved it and saw a list of four names. On Monday, a female student was found to be writing a list containing two names.

"At this point in time, we're taking it very seriously. . . . Frankly, we take any threat as a serious threat until it's sort of proved otherwise," said Superintendent John Tuffy, who would not describe what raised school officials' suspicions about the lists.

Tuffy said it was not clear if the two students were linked.

"That's being looked into right now. There are a number of questions that we all would like answers to," he said.

Kingston Police Chief Joseph Rebello did not immediately return a telephone message seeking comment.

Read it online here.

~~~

After attending "School Discipline, Juvenile Justice and the Realities of Race" sponsored by The Boston Lawyer Chapter of the American Constitution Society, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, the Juvenile Justice Center at Suffolk University Law School and the Criminal Law Section of the Boston Bar Association at The Boston Public Library Tuesday night and being reminded of the School to Prison Pipeline, I couldn't help but be astounded at the evidence of overuse of zero tolerance policies that seems to be exhibited by the above article.

It amazes me what we criminalize these days and what our "authorities" want to "take seriously".

Termination of Parental Rights Does not End Child Support Obligation (Illinois Supreme Court rules)

Termination of Parental Rights Does not End Child Support Obligation
by Barbara Glesner Fines, Ruby M. Hulen Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City

In an unpublished opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the termination of parental rights does not extinguish a child support obligation unless the child is being adopted. Thus, a father whose parental rights are terminated must continue to pay support for a child in foster care. Relying on statutory language that refers to "a child sought to be adopted" the court held that merely being available for adoption is not sufficient to sever the responsibilities to the child. Three judges dissented. Illinois DHFS v. Warner, Ill., Illinois Supreme Court, January 25, 2008.

To view the opinion and for more information, go to the Family Law Prof Blog at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2008/02/case-law-develo.html

CHINS cases: Parents have the right to counsel.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged today that parents are entitled to intervene and to have counsel (appointed if indigent) in Child in Need of Services (CHINS) cases when the court is considering granting custody of their children to DSS. Describing the statutory scheme as one capable of "substantial" intrusion on the parent-child relationship and children as "'those most dear' to parents", Justice Ireland (a former Juvenile Court judge) ruled that "pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 29, after a child is adjudicated a child in need of services, a parent is entitled to counsel at the dispositional phase of the proceeding if custody of the child could be granted to the department." In the Matter of HILARY (and a consolidated case), SJC-10036 (argued October 2, 2007, decided February 5, 2008).

Corporal punishment

Following a discussion on the Arlington email list about anti-corporal punishment legislation that Rep. Jay Kaufman filed on behalf of Arlington resident Kathleen Wolf, Rep. Kaufman posted his rationale for testifying in favor of the bill.

My reply to Rep. Kaufman's post and letter to the editor:

I believe that the Department of Social Services (DSS) provided misleading statistics to the Legislature that Rep. Kaufman cited in his testimony and Letter to the Editor concerning the corporal punishment bill (The Advocate, December 6, 2007) .

My experience as an attorney who has represented parents and children in abuse and neglect cases for almost 30 years tells me that the "19,000 cases of abuse reported to DSS in the 3rd Quarter" almost certainly included "incidental or minor physical contact" that the bill exempts and its proponents say they are not concerned about.

The mandated reporting statute (General Laws chapter 119, section 51A) is interpreted by DSS to require reporting whenever there is any suspicion of abuse or neglect.

I have had two cases already this quarter and several more in my career in which DSS decided to "support for abuse" in cases where there was merely a "spanking" or "a swat". Involvement of DSS in those families and its erroneous findings that there was abuse occurred even though "abuse" is defined in DSS's own regulations and the Supreme Judicial Court's 1999 *Cobble* case as requiring more than brief, minor pain and a rapidly fading red mark.

The referral of 1,200 cases to the District Attorney (DA) level is cited as meaning that "there was compelling evidence of abuse and prosecution was warranted." Not so. Under DSS regulations referral to the DA merely means that a DSS "investigator" has determined that there was "reasonable cause to believe" that certain serious kinds of abuse had occurred. "Reasonable cause" does not require physical evidence or even medical confirmation.

If the cited statistic was even the number of cases referred by DSS on which DAs filed criminal cases, maybe it would be an indication that someone had determined there was "probable cause" to believe a crime had been committed. That is not what a DSS referral to the DA means. "Reasonable cause" in DSS-speak does not equal "probable cause." Rarely are any of the 19,000 reported cases presented to a court or even to anyone outside of the intake unit for independent fact-finding determinations.

The constitutional burden of proof for criminal cases is "beyond a reasonable doubt." Courts have ruled that family relationships can be permanently severed upon "clear and convincing evidence." To temporarily remove a child from a family into foster care while the court determines if the child is at risk of harm requires only "a fair preponderance of the evidence." But DSS referring a case to the DA is an even lower standard -- "reasonable cause to believe" that abuse has occurred. The fact that only "1,200 of [the 19,000 reported cases] "advanced to the DA's level" means that 17,800 were either "unsupported" or were found not to have any evidence of serious abuse.

Yes, abuse is a serious problem and should be uncovered, prosecuted and prevented. Children should be protected from it. But, if this bill passes DSS, an agency that already involves itself with 80,000 cases per year (many of which are not significant enough to refer for law enforcement investigation), will have an excuse to continue its micromanagement of parents who do not conform to its belief that all physical contact in discipline is harmful and warrants intervention.

I am certainly in favor of the legislative deliberations that Rep. Kaufman's testimony suggests but I think focusing on corporal punishment and giving DSS additional incentive to investigate families that use it reasonably, runs the risk of driving parents underground with their questions about how best to raise their children. If medical and other childcare professionals must report a family to DSS every time there is a suspicion of the use of corporal punishment, insecure parents may refrain from asking for advice.

So, yes, have the debate; reforms are needed. The Legislature should consider requiring a judicial determination of probable cause or real, documentable exigent circumstances (as I believe to be required by the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution and Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights) before DSS is allowed to pierce a family's privacy or take their children involuntarily into foster care.

I respectfully urge the legislature not to pass this bill. Stop abuse, prevent abuse, prosecute abuse - but keep the government out of the private affairs of families.

was published in The Arlington Advocate as a Guest Column "More on corporal punishment" and was promoted by Atty. Deborah Sirotkin Butler on the Blue Mass Group blog "Legislation on corporal punishment - protection for children or invasion of privacy ?".

The issue seems to sharply divide people between those who believe that all corporal punishment constitutes abuse or battery and should be punished and those who think that corporal punishment is a personal choice and may not warrant state intervention in all cases.

Guardianship a "Risky Strategy"?

When I first started reading Justice Cowin's decision for the Massachusetts Appeals Court in Guardianship of Estelle, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 575 (2007), I was encouraged by the statement that the trial judge's decision "cannot stand as a matter of law because the father is correct that, absent a finding of unfitness on his part, the judge is without authority to require that he share parenting decisions with others".

I didn't stop to think that the "remand for further findings in accordance with the discussion below" would result in anything other than the Appeals Court sticking to that straight forward black letter law assertion.

Unfortunately, Justice Cowin goes on to encourage the trial judge to reconsider whether actions on the part of the father that the trial judge was not willing to call abuse, neglect or unfitness still might make the father unfit "to parent this child in these circumstances at this time." [Emphasis in original.]

The opinion goes on, "Though the importance and parameters of an attachment to a foster parent or guardian have varied, the validity of considering the effect of a transfer of custody on the child as an element of the fitness of the transferee has been upheld consistently." The decision thus allows the trial judge to rethink whether the father's seeking help from the aunt and uncle during his hard times and the resulting attachment the child has to the aunt and uncle might permit denying the father's request for return of the child; without even requiring expert testimony on the issue of whether a transfer might harm the child or how such harm might be mitigated after a transfer back to the father.

As Attorney Deborah Sirotkin Butler pointed out in an email to me and posts (as AmberPaw*) on several parent and child defense attorney email lists, what this decision should make "clear, is that agreeing to a guardianship is a risky strategy for an unwed parent, especially a father, as the case law seems to be moving in the direction of making it harder and harder to retrieve a child from a guardianship, and the mere length of time a guardianship endures and the 'bonds' that form, make it hard to extract a child". [Emphasis added; questionable use 'quotes' in original.]

* Speaking of AmberPaw, you should check out her posts about DSS reform on the BlueMassGroup blog.

DSS Reform Bill

Massachusetts House Bill 4191 An "Act Relative to Child Abuse and Neglect" is scheduled for public hearing tomorrow (9/26/07, 10:30 a.m. in room 222) by the Legislature's Joint Committee on Children, Families and Persons with Disabilities.

Though the bill fixes several of the issues of lack of real oversight highlighted by the Haleigh Poutre case, too much of the lack of oversight, dearth of definitions, confusing language and lack of due process for families in the current statute are left essentially untouched. What tries to look like major overhaul of the whole statutory scheme is really just a minor tune up of a small portion of what really affects families involved with the child protection system.

I am afraid that passage of the bill in its entirety will make it appear that thoughtful consideration was given by the legislature to the troubling issues that are really not addressed.

I call on Senator Spilka, Rep. Coakley-Rivera and the rest of their committee to recommend passage of the new oversight and second opinion provisions of H. 4191 but to remove the portions that merely restate the existing sections of chapter 18B and 119 until a comprehensive review and restructuring particularly recognizing parents' rights, due process, probable cause and true judicial oversight of DSS or the Department of Children and Families can be accomplished.