A report in the Brockton Enterprise Increases in shaken baby cases concerns officials tells of various officials' speculation about the rise in reported cases of suspected shaken babies.
There are experts in the field of evidence-based medicine who suggest that there are other explanations for many of the injuries that the shaken baby prevention advocates attribute solely to vigorous shaking. The pediatric neurologist and pediatric radiographer who spoke at a seminar I attended sponsored by the (Massachusetts) Juvenile Bar Association two years ago delineated the genesis of Shaken Baby Syndrome. They pointed out the flaws in the "research" of the founder of the Shaken Baby movement and how the advocates ignored contrary evidence in a series of cases.
The Shaken Baby Advocates insisted that the injuries and signs apparent in various infants and toddlers could not have been caused by anything other than being vigorously in the manner they propose. Then the evidence-based medicine teams would scientifically prove that the injuries could have been caused by a car accident as described by the accused parents in one case, by falling down the stairs with the baby as described by the accused parents in another case and even by falling out of a high chair as described by the accused parents in yet another.
The cases often rely on the assertion that certain retinal damage patterns can only be caused by a baby being vigorously shaken but the evidence-based presenters showed that the claim was based on believing an assumption that did not look at a wide enough collection of retinal damage patients. When retinal images across other medical specialties besides just child abuse pediatrics are viewed, there are many other causes including some as benign as sneezing that cause the retinal images that shaken baby prosecutors so often rely upon.
The bad economy may be causing a lot of hardship but it is not necessarily the cause of an increase in reported shaken baby cases. An increase in reported shaken baby cases may not even be caused by an increase in shaken babies. When DCF investigators or police are investigating an injured baby case they may well have a predilection to think shaken baby and be dealing with a system of "experts" too quick to disbelieve the parents and assume inflicted injury.
If you are the subject of a 51A (report of child abuse or neglect), are accused of having shaken your baby or are subjected to any other investigation by police or the Department of Children and Families (DCF, formerly the Department of Social Services, DSS) be sure to contact an attorney with experience in this field BEFORE your interviews, BEFORE letting them into your home.
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Monday, May 11, 2009
Families are too important to fail.
In an op/ed piece in today's Boston Globe, Vulnerable children are suffering twice, the chief of Ambulatory Pediatrics at Boston Medical Center and the executive director of The Children's League of Massachusetts tell the story of a mother helped by the Department of Children and Families despite budget cuts.
The "vulnerable children" piece starts by saying the mother brought her children into the clinic "recently." By a couple paragraphs later they are "back home". More often, in my experience, the other parent or a caring family member, let alone "a family friend" is denied the opportunity to help with their troubled relative's children when troubles are brought to the attention of DSS/DCF. It seems to me that not having this repeat customer's kids be subjected to a longer stay in foster care with strangers might be an unintended benefit of DCF's increasing caseload and decreasing budget. Maybe DCF's budget crisis helped these children get home more quickly.
If increasing caseloads and a tightening budget cause DCF workers and supervisors to give additional thought to whether children need to be in foster care and whether their families can be helped instead of being discarded while the children get a brand new "forever family," it might go a long way toward making DCF into a valuable safety net to which troubled parents feel safe turning for help instead of a feared monster set only on gobbling up their children and spitting out the parents who love them.
The authors end by saying:
Read the rest of the Globe op/ed here.
Despite their increasing caseloads, the late-night DCF worker and a supervisor came to assess the situation. They knew something we didn't - that this wasn't the first time this mother, a depressed refugee who had been through God knows what before arriving in the United States, had told a caregiver that she was in trouble. By the end of the evening, the mother was in the hospital being treated for her depression, and the children were safe in an emergency placement. The next day, with the mother's agreement, they were placed with a family friend. Now, the mother is out of the hospital with daily supports and the children are back home.From my perspective as an attorney who has seen way too many cases in which the only help a troubled family received from DSS was to have their children placed in foster care and to face an unnecessarily long and arduous process of getting them back, this case may represent an unintended benefit of DCF's budget and caseload problems. All too often, in my and my colleagues' caseloads, a mother with a history with the Department mentions to a "caregiver" that she is feeling overwhelmed only to have had DSS place her kids in foster care and put them on an adoption track because the mother couldn't "correct" her condition quickly enough.
The "vulnerable children" piece starts by saying the mother brought her children into the clinic "recently." By a couple paragraphs later they are "back home". More often, in my experience, the other parent or a caring family member, let alone "a family friend" is denied the opportunity to help with their troubled relative's children when troubles are brought to the attention of DSS/DCF. It seems to me that not having this repeat customer's kids be subjected to a longer stay in foster care with strangers might be an unintended benefit of DCF's increasing caseload and decreasing budget. Maybe DCF's budget crisis helped these children get home more quickly.
If increasing caseloads and a tightening budget cause DCF workers and supervisors to give additional thought to whether children need to be in foster care and whether their families can be helped instead of being discarded while the children get a brand new "forever family," it might go a long way toward making DCF into a valuable safety net to which troubled parents feel safe turning for help instead of a feared monster set only on gobbling up their children and spitting out the parents who love them.
The authors end by saying:
Citibank, AIG, and the automakers have received unprecedented amounts of money from the federal government because they are deemed "too big to fail." We need to remember to look out for those who are "too little to fail."To that I would add that families need to be thought of as "too important to fail" and that therefore more of them may need to be treated with the respect and true assistance that this refugee mother apparently received instead of keeping them from their families and rushing them to "permanency" in non-family placements.
Read the rest of the Globe op/ed here.
Thursday, May 7, 2009
In re: Adoption of Sebastian
Fascinating case of first impression from Manhattan Surrogates Court -- In re: Adoption of Sebastian. Mom whose ovum was implanted in her spouse's uteris after in vitro fertilization is permitted to adopt her child to ensure full, safe recognition of her legal relationship with the child.
The court noted that because of the international nature of the couple, because of the state's out-dated paternity laws and because of the federal "Defense of Marriage Act" (so-called), though there were less expensive, quicker ways to protect the relationship to which genetic mom was entitled with her child, adoption was the only way to assure full and complete recognition.
Read full opinion here.
The court noted that because of the international nature of the couple, because of the state's out-dated paternity laws and because of the federal "Defense of Marriage Act" (so-called), though there were less expensive, quicker ways to protect the relationship to which genetic mom was entitled with her child, adoption was the only way to assure full and complete recognition.
Read full opinion here.
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Student Arrested For Classroom Texting
When you put cops in schools, school discipline issues become police issues.
According to the The Smoking Gun "A 14-year-old Wisconsin girl who refused to stop texting during a high school math class was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct ..." Read the rest of the story, including the 5 page police report here.
See also SchooltoPrison.org "Challenging the School to Prison Pipeline".
According to the The Smoking Gun "A 14-year-old Wisconsin girl who refused to stop texting during a high school math class was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct ..." Read the rest of the story, including the 5 page police report here.
See also SchooltoPrison.org "Challenging the School to Prison Pipeline".
Monday, February 9, 2009
Gender discrimination in sexual abuse cases?
On February 6, 2009, in the case of Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., a juvenile, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered the Plymouth County District Attorney to provide discovery to defense counsel so that the defendant might be able to make out a case of discriminatory selective enforcement of statutory rape laws against male juveniles.
Bernardo was the eldest (having "just entered his teens") and only male amongst a group of four playmates (the other three were females "on the cusp of their teenage years") who engaged in various kinds of sexual touching at Bernardo's request. Bernardo's father found a text on Bernardo's cell phone from one of the girls talking about a sex act she would have performed on him if one of the other girls had not been present. Mr. B. called the girl's mother with his concern. The girl's parents called the police. After investigation and sexual abuse interviews in which the girls described Bernardo "pressuring" them to touch him in various ways Bernardo was charged with delinquency for three counts of statutory rape, amongst other charges.
Bernardo's defense attorney tried to get the District Attorney to prosecute the girls for their sex acts on, the also under aged, Bernardo but the DA declined. Bernardo filed applications for criminal complaints against the girls but the Clerk-Magistrate declined to issue complaints.
Chief Justice Marshall, in a 3-2 decision, ruled that "[T]he single justice [who refused to vacate the juvenile court judge's order granting the defendant's discovery requests] did not abuse her discretion in declining to vacate the ruling of the motion judge that the boy has made a threshold showing based on credible evidence that he is entitled to discovery for the purpose of investigating and, if warranted, raising a claim of selective prosecution."
Press reports of the case imply that the SJC ruled that there was selective prosecution. The case really only says that the defendant has raised enough of a question about selective prosecution that he is entitled to force the DA to produce statistics that may help him show that he was discriminatorily prosecuted on the basis of being male. Once the information is provided, the defendant will still have a heavy burden to meet in attempting to overcome the presumption of validity granted to prosecutorial discretion.
Also of interest in the case was a brief history of statutory rape. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
It remains to be seen whether Bernardo will be able to make out his selective prosecution case and thereby get the complaint against him dismissed. His motion "to dismiss the statutory rape claim on the ground that the law was unconstitutional as applied to him ... remains undecided, [and was] not before [the SJC]. The decision noted also that "As a result of the arrest and charges, the boy has been suspended from school and removed from its football team. He is being tutored at home."
Bernardo was the eldest (having "just entered his teens") and only male amongst a group of four playmates (the other three were females "on the cusp of their teenage years") who engaged in various kinds of sexual touching at Bernardo's request. Bernardo's father found a text on Bernardo's cell phone from one of the girls talking about a sex act she would have performed on him if one of the other girls had not been present. Mr. B. called the girl's mother with his concern. The girl's parents called the police. After investigation and sexual abuse interviews in which the girls described Bernardo "pressuring" them to touch him in various ways Bernardo was charged with delinquency for three counts of statutory rape, amongst other charges.
Bernardo's defense attorney tried to get the District Attorney to prosecute the girls for their sex acts on, the also under aged, Bernardo but the DA declined. Bernardo filed applications for criminal complaints against the girls but the Clerk-Magistrate declined to issue complaints.
Chief Justice Marshall, in a 3-2 decision, ruled that "[T]he single justice [who refused to vacate the juvenile court judge's order granting the defendant's discovery requests] did not abuse her discretion in declining to vacate the ruling of the motion judge that the boy has made a threshold showing based on credible evidence that he is entitled to discovery for the purpose of investigating and, if warranted, raising a claim of selective prosecution."
Press reports of the case imply that the SJC ruled that there was selective prosecution. The case really only says that the defendant has raised enough of a question about selective prosecution that he is entitled to force the DA to produce statistics that may help him show that he was discriminatorily prosecuted on the basis of being male. Once the information is provided, the defendant will still have a heavy burden to meet in attempting to overcome the presumption of validity granted to prosecutorial discretion.
Also of interest in the case was a brief history of statutory rape. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
Statutory rape is an offense of ancient origins. "First codified into English law in 1275, statutory rape criminalized sexual relations with females under the age of twelve." Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 Buff. L.Rev. 703, 754 (2000). The aim of this gender-specific statute was not the protection of young females but the protection of fathers' property interests in their young daughters, whose loss of virginity would severely depress the value of the dowry the father would receive on his daughter's marriage. Id. at 754-755. By the late Sixteenth Century, the aim of the law evolved to a statute designed to protect men from charges of illegal sex with young girls. The age of consent was lowered to ten years and so it stood when the American colonies, including Massachusetts, absorbed English common law and adopted the English law of statutory rape. General Laws of Massachusetts Colony at 15 (1672), reprinted in Colonial Laws of Massachusetts 1672-1686 (1887) ("whosoever he be shall commit or have Carnal Copulation with any such [woman] Childe under ten years old ... he shall be put to death"); Province Laws 1692-1693, c. 19, § 11 (capital offense for any man to "unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any woman child under the age of ten years"). See generally Note, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & Pol'y 717, 725-726 (2008). In the late Nineteenth Century, in response to the widespread sexual exploitation of young girls in factories and urban centers, temperance organizations and other reform groups launched a nationwide effort to raise the age of consent. In Massachusetts, between 1886 and 1898, the age of consent rose from ten to thirteen, then fourteen, then sixteen years of age. See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 170 Mass. 194, 195-196 (1898) (summarizing statutory amendments to age of consent). As in Elizabethan times, however, only females could be the victims of statutory rape.
There have been more recent efforts to reform our American statutory rape law. Statute 1974, c. 474, § 3, struck the word "female" from G.L. c. 265, § 23. Compare St.1974, c. 474, § 3, with St.1966, c. 291. See also note 3, supra. As we noted in Commonwealth v. Hackett, 383 Mass. 888, 888 (1981): "In general, the 1974 amendment eliminated prior language which defined the victims of rape as female or female children. Instead, the victims are now defined as persons or children and the generic masculine pronoun is substituted throughout. Both males and females are protected from sexual assault by this same statute, which is neutral as to the gender of the victim. Nor does the statute define the various crimes with reference to the gender of the offender. The result is that the penalties for sexual intercourse and unnatural sexual intercourse are the same without regard to the gender of the victim."
Modern amendments leave no doubt about the Legislature's intent to protect all children under sixteen years old from sexual abuse. The statutory rape law, as well, makes clear that perpetrators of statutory rape may be either male or female. Statutory rape in Massachusetts is a strict liability felony. Only two elements are needed to support a conviction under G.L. c. 265, § 23: "(1) sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with (2) a child under sixteen years of age." Commonwealth v. Miller, 385 Mass. 521, 522 (1982). See id. at 525 (noting that mistake as to age is not defense to statutory rape in Massachusetts). Force is not a necessary element of the crime. Moreover, conviction of statutory rape has weighty consequence beyond incarceration. Those convicted enter the Commonwealth's sex offender registry and are required to abide by all of the obligations and restrictions contained therein. See G.L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q.
It remains to be seen whether Bernardo will be able to make out his selective prosecution case and thereby get the complaint against him dismissed. His motion "to dismiss the statutory rape claim on the ground that the law was unconstitutional as applied to him ... remains undecided, [and was] not before [the SJC]. The decision noted also that "As a result of the arrest and charges, the boy has been suspended from school and removed from its football team. He is being tutored at home."
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